












The John Molson School of Business 
 
 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Science in Administration (Finance) at 
Concordia University 















School of Graduate Studies 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
By:            Dan Zhang  
Entitled:    Earnings Management Surrounding Takeover Rumours                       
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science in Administration (Finance Option) 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to 
originality and quality. 















Approved by   ________________________________________________ 
Thomas Walker, Graduate Program Director 
 
________________________________________________ 
                        Anne-Marie Croteau, Dean of Faculty 
 
Date ________________________________________________  




Earnings Management Surrounding Takeover Rumours 
Dan Zhang 
Abstract 
I investigate whether firms manage earnings in proximity to initially published rumours of their 
impending takeover. Utilizing a unique sample of 1,831 takeover rumours, I find that rumoured 
target firms inflate their earnings prior to the rumour's publication. Rumours which are more likely 
to be anticipated by the target firm (rumours initiated by targets, rumours concerning financial 
distress, and rumours concerning the hiring of a financial advisor) provide stronger associations 
with earnings management than do other rumour types. I interpret results as consistent with 
rumored target firms attempting to benefit from higher takeover valuations if takeover bids are 
indeed forthcoming 
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1. Instruction  
Within the context of mergers and acquisitions, the ability to subjectively manipulate accounting 
results is an important issue. Erickson and Wang (1999), Louis (2004), and Gong (2008) all find 
that acquirers engaging in stock swap mergers are likely to increase their earnings prior to the 
merger announcement date in order to increase their stock price, thus lowering the value paid to 
the corresponding target firm. There is, however, a dearth of studies focusing on whether the target 
itself also engages in earnings management practices in an attempt to receive higher premiums; 
this may be because prior to a takeover announcement it is difficult for target firms to identify and 
time the acquisition deal (Erickson and Wang, 1999), and thus too late for the target firm to engage 
in any earnings manipulation. 
This paper addresses this issue by analyzing an event which precedes takeover announcements, 
namely the first published instance of an article clearly indicating that a certain firm is a potential 
takeover candidate. Specifically, I use a sample of 1,831 takeover rumours constructed by Betton, 
Davis, and Walker (2017) to determine whether firms who may reasonably expect impending 
takeover offers engage in earnings management to increase the value of such offers made. 
Earnings management is a process whereby managers utilize accounting techniques, such as 
reporting fictional revenues, delaying expenses, writing-off assets, and opportunistic estimation to 
manage earnings, typically upward. Such procedures are legal providing managers remain within 
the limits of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), as GAAP provides managers 
with some discretion in the management of their firm’s earnings and allows managers to determine 
whether reported earnings should be aggressive or conservative. While such procedures do not 
affect cash flow, they do impact firms’ earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
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amortization (EBITDA), and EBITDA is widely used by investment bankers to evaluate both 
acquisition partners and acquisition premiums (Louis, 2004).  
Earnings management activities are not costly to implement as they can be completed without 
destructive economic events. However, detecting earnings management is costly. For markets and 
investors, it is hard to identify and qualify the extent to which managers use earnings management. 
For acquirers, the board or management team can hire advisors, experts, and experienced auditors 
to detect and qualify earnings management. The detection process is, however, time-consuming 
and the cost of detection can be a significant burden for firms about to go through a merger. 
To analyze the earnings management of target firms rumoured to be subject to an impending 
takeover, I investigate two major research questions. First, I examine whether rumoured target 
firms manipulate their accounting earnings upward prior to the rumour release date. Second, I 
examine whether specific types of rumours are more strongly related to earnings management, as 
they may represent cases in which the connection to potential future takeover activity is very 
evident to the target firm. Specifically, I hypothesize that rumours which are initiated by the target, 
rumours which indicate a financial advisor was hired by the target, and rumours suggesting the 
target firm is in financial distress will provide the strongest associations with earnings management, 
as target firms are more likely to anticipate such rumours and thus manipulate earnings accordingly.  
I analyze a sample, constructed by Betton, Davis, and Walker (2017), with 1,831 initial rumours 
from 2002 to 2011 merged with the Compustat dataset for necessary accounting fundamental data. 
Consistent with previous studies, I use the difference between total accruals and estimated accruals 
as a proxy for earnings management. Following Erickson and Wang (1999), the Jones Model is 
applied to estimate accruals. 
3 
 
The results suggest that firms do indeed manipulate their earnings upward in pre-rumour quarters. 
Significant results are found in both aggregated and separated time levels. Furthermore, I provide 
evidence of the sources of documented earnings management. Results further indicate that as 
hypothesized, firms are more likely to participate in earnings management in pre-rumour quarters 
when the rumors themselves are more easily anticipated. 
To consolidate my results, I construct a matched sample for my rumoured sample firms and test 
whether the earnings management levels differ significantly. The results indicate that the earnings 
management levels of rumoured target firms are significantly higher than that of firms from the 
matched sample. Furthermore, I develop a robustness test by adjusting estimated accruals through 
a performance match approach in order to eliminate the possibility that results are exclusively 
dependent upon the Jones Model. I test my hypotheses again and the results are consistent with 
those of my previous tests. 
Pre-rumour period evidence of earnings management by rumoured target firms provides several 
contributions to extant studies. First, it contributes to our understanding of the earnings 
management activities of rumoured target firms in a merger and acquisition setting, thereby 
allowing us to have a better understanding of firms’ corporate events. In addition, it contributes to 
our understanding of how firms use media coverage to their benefit in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a review of previous studies, Section 
3 presents the two major hypotheses, Section 4 reports the sample and descriptive statistics, 
Section 5 presents the methodology used to estimate earnings management, Section 6 displays the 
empirical results, Section 7 discusses the robustness tests, and Section 8 presents the conclusions. 
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2. Literature  
2.1 Earnings Management  
Earning management is a common phenomenon among publicly traded firms. Earnings 
management refers to the accounting techniques used to refine financial reports and change 
apparent firm performance to satisfy the interests of shareholders and creditors of firms. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) offers managers flexibility and opportunities to apply 
accounting choices to manage earnings. This then benefits the firm and increases its wealth 
(Pornsit et al., 2008). Thus, companies have the potential to use earnings management to smooth 
out fluctuations in earnings, resulting in a bright prospect for the firms’ futures. This is often 
received positively by the public, leading to an increase in share price (Erickson and Wang, 1999). 
Earnings management activities are observed in a wide spectrum of settings. Extant studies find 
firms tend to manipulate their earnings prior to certain corporate events, such as initial public 
offerings (IPOs) (Teoh, Welch, and Wong,1998), seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) (Shivakumar, 
2000), and open-market repurchases (Gong, Louis and Sun, 2008), and Lie, 2005). 
Prior studies have also observed earnings management within the context of mergers and 
acquisitions. Erickson and Wang (1999) find that acquirers who are engaging in stock for stock 
mergers are likely to increase their earnings in the period prior to the announcement date of the 
merger agreement. They also state that target firms also have incentives to increase their earnings 
prior to the merger announcement date. They detected positive unexpected accruals during the pre-
merger period, but they have not proven these unexpected accruals are significantly different from 
zero. However, these insignificant results may be due to the timing of the acquisitions. They state 
that acquirers have more flexibility and time to identify targets and initiate the negotiations. For 
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target firm managers, however, it is too late for them to manage their earnings once the acquirer 
initiates the bid.  
Louis's (2004) finding is consistent with previous studies. He contends that bidders tend to inflate 
their earnings preceding the stock swap announcement in order to raise their stock price. He then 
finds a reverse relationship between pre-merger earnings management and post-merger long-term 
stock performance. Jensen (2005) asserts that overvalued firms in a merger tend to inflate their 
earnings to meet the market expectation. Furthermore, Easterwood (2011) suggests that managers 
of firms which are faced with the threat of takeover, especially that of a hostile takeover, have 
strong incentives to manage reported earnings. Those firms attempt to inflate their reported 
earnings to prevent shareholders from supporting takeovers. He finds that targets of hostile 
takeovers tend to inflate earnings prior to the initiation of hostile takeovers.  Baik, Kang and 
Morton (2007) find that when acquirers are faced with higher estimation of risk, such as in 
acquisitions of privately owned targets in different industries, they are more likely to have higher 
abnormal accruals.  
Previous studies also focus on earnings management in management buyouts. DeAngelo (1986) 
posits that managers tend to manipulate reported earnings prior to management buyouts. However, 
he finds no evidence for pre-buyout earnings management. In contrast, Perry and Williams (1994) 
find significant evidence of downward managerial manipulation of reported earnings in the period 
prior to management buyout because management has strong incentives to reduce the purchase 
price. Meulbroek (1992) observes significant run-ups in target firm stock price a month prior to 
initial merger announcements and tender offer announcements. However, these run-ups are largely 
due to news leakage and insider trading (Meulbroek, 1992, Shivakumar, 2000, and Schwert, 1996) 
rather than earnings management.  
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2.2 Takeover Rumours 
My study also relates to the literature on takeover rumours. Prior studies pay attention to the power 
and accuracy of rumours in merger and acquisition settings. Ahern and Sosyura (2014) view firms 
as active players which can use media coverage to impact their stock price. They state that in the 
time around corporate events (such as mergers and acquisitions, stock issues, repurchases, and 
proxy contests) press can be used by firms to manipulate their stock price. Analyzing a sample of 
507 mergers found within both the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) and Factiva 
databases, they find that target firms with increased media coverage have increased share price 
during the negotiation period, and negotiation periods tend to have increased media coverage as 
well. These findings are consistent with the studies of Huberman and Regev (2001) and Tetlock 
(2007), which confirm that firms strategically use the press to boost their stock price, with large 
run-ups in stock price attributed to investors’ attention and overreaction.  
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) assert that target firms experience dramatic increases in stock price 
before a formal bid announcement date. They examine 172 cash tender offers from 1981 to 1985 
and find that both unexpected premiums and run-ups in target share price can be largely explained 
by the presence of rumours about an impending bid in the media. Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) 
examine the effect of takeover rumours on stock price using a sample of 42 rumours published on 
the “Heard on the Street” (HOTS) column of the Wall Street Journal between 1983 and 1985. 
They find target firm stock price run-ups over 20 trading days before the materialization of 
rumours. They also find no abnormal profits from buying the shares of firms mentioned in the 
column, even though these stocks show a significant positive excess return in the 20 trading days 
before the publishing of a rumour.  
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In addition to the HOTS column, Zivney, Bertin and Torabzadeh (1996) also use the “Abreast of 
the Market” (AOTM) column, which appears on the same page from Wall Street Journal as the 
HOTS column. They examine a sample of 871 takeover rumours between 1985 and 1988 and show 
that the 302 initial rumours from the AOTM column have higher prediction power, in terms of 
rumour accuracy, and that the rumoured firms experience significant run-ups before the rumour 
date.  By analysing the post-rumour publication return and investor overreaction, they posit 
optimized holding and buying strategies.  
Ahern and Sosyura (2015) construct a sample of 501 initial merger rumours from the Factiva 
database between 2000 and 2011.  They examine the prediction power of corporate takeover 
rumours and assert that the media has an incentive to publish sensational news, with the journalist’s 
experience, specialized education, and industry expertise influencing the accuracy of rumours. 
Consistent with extant findings, Clarkson, Joyce and Tutticci (2006) show that rumours are always 
associated with abnormal returns. They analyze 189 takeover rumour postings in the Hotcopper 
Internet Discussion Site from May 1999 to March 2000 and find abnormal returns and trading 
volumes the day before and the day of the rumour publishing.  
3. Hypotheses  
Many studies have examined the connection between acquirer earnings management and takeover 
rumours.  There is, however a relative dearth of studies focusing on the relationship of target firm 
earnings management. As previously stated, Erickson and Wang (1999) find positive but 
insignificant pre-merger unexplained accruals for target firms surrounding the takeover 
announcement, and they attribute these insignificant results to the inflexibility of targets and the 
timings of transactions; i.e., by the time the takeover announcement is evident, target firms rarely 
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have enough time to engage in undetected earnings manipulation, even if they desire to do so. As 
we know that firms actively use media coverage around corporate events to manipulate their stock 
price (Ahern and Sosyura, 2015; Cook, Kieschnick, and Ness, 2006; and Chen, 2003), it seems 
reasonable to examine whether target firms manipulate their earnings around events other than 
takeover announcements. I specifically examine target firm earnings management surrounding the 
initial publicized rumours of their acquisition, as this event provides target firm managers with a 
reason for manipulating earnings (a potential takeover premium), yet may afford them enough time 
to implement such manipulation before the acquirer has determined the offer amount. 
I thus investigate two major research questions in order to determine the extent, if any, of earnings 
management for firms rumored to be takeover targets: First, I hypothesize that in general, 
rumoured target firms manipulate their accounting earnings upwards close to the rumour release 
date, in an attempt to inflate the transaction price of the acquisition. Second, I hypothesize that 
rumours which are easier for target firm managers to anticipate provide stronger evidence of 
earnings management. Such rumour types include those are initiated by the target firm itself, those 
which indicate a financial advisor has been hired, and those which indicate that the firm has been 
in financial distress for some time and rumours concerning retaining investment bank service. In 
these circumstances, the timing of the takeover rumour is more certain, permitting strategic 
implementation of earnings management in the period prior. In addition, managers of financially 
distressed firms have clear incentives to manipulate their earnings and are likely to understand 
their vulnerability to an impending takeover attempt (Nagar and Sen, 2016). I rephrase my 
hypotheses as below: 
Hypothesis 1: Rumoured target firms manipulate their accounting earnings upwards prior to the 
rumour release date, in an attempt to inflate the transaction price of the acquisition. 
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Hypothesis 2: Rumours which are easier for target firm managers to anticipate provide stronger 
evidence of prior earnings management. 
4. Data and Sample 
I use the rumour sample constructed by Betton, Davis, and Walker (2017), which identified 2,074 
initial takeover rumours of target firms in the period between January 2002 and December 2011. 
They constructed this sample by searching public U.S. firms listed in the Centre for Research in 
Security Price (CRSP) database and matching them with rumours taken from S&P Takeover Talk, 
S&P Capital IQ, Zephyr, Factiva and Pro-Quest. These sources include thousands of newspapers, 
news wires, and business journals during the period from 2002 to 2011. They ultimately identified 
2,074 rumours, which have a 180-day clean window1 preceding the rumour date, and categorize 
each according to one or more of 21 rumour types as presented in Appendices Table 1. Since 
previous studies question the accuracy of the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database (Faccio 
and Masulis 2005), they also provide verification and correction for the sample data by manually 
searching rumoured target firm announcement dates on both Factiva and Google. 
In the rumour sample, there are 1,152 unique target firms subject to rumours during the period 
from 2002 to 2011. After eliminating firms without complete accounting data as required to 
compute earnings management, there remain 1,831 identified initial rumours representing 1,079 
uniquely rumoured target firms.  
In Table 1, I show the distribution of sample firms by Fama – French 48 industry codes and by 
rumour year. Business service has the most of initial rumour among the 48 industries, with 16.6% 
                                                          
1 Betton, Davis, and Walker (2017) search back to make sure similar rumours do not exist for those rumoured target 
firm within the last 180 days, recording only the initial rumour. 
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of the total rumours. Capital-intensive industries make up much of the sample, with Pharmaceutical 
Product, retail industry, and petroleum and natural gas products accounting for 11.41%, 8.03%, and 
7.97% of the sample respectively.  
As displayed in panel B of Table 1, the number of merger and acquisition related rumours increases 
over time. This is consistent with Sosyura (2014), who finds that firms are actively engaging in 
media coverage. In Panel B, I also present SDC merger and acquisitions deals during sample period. 
As observed in Panel B, the number of M&A deals recorded in Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum 
database increases over time but there’s fluctuations during financial crisis (2008-2010). 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
In Table 2, I present the summary statistics for all the 21 rumour categories, grouped by event year, 
in my sample. Rumour characteristics are not mutually exclusive, which means one rumour can 
have multiple characteristics. I divide the ten sample years into three periods: Pre-financial crisis 
(2002-2007), the financial crisis (2008-2009), and post-crisis (2010-2011). Overall, the number of 
scoop rumours increases year by year, with the sum of the last two years six times that of the 
previous years. This suggests that even during the financial crisis, firms rarely decreased their 
manipulation of media coverage. 
[Insert Table 2] 
In Table 3, I present additional summary statistics of fundamental information for my sample of 
target firms, including rumoured target firm sales, total assets, earnings and market value. The 
rumoured target firm in our sample, with an average (median) total assets of $6,433.39 ($ 1985.80) 
and average (median) market value of $5,891 ($ 2,148) million, are relatively small. The quarterly 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) for rumoured target firms range from -$6,077 to $10,496, 
which means some firms are profitable while others are experiencing losses. Since the sample is 
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heavily concentrated in capital-intensive industries, I also present the quarterly earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to have a more precise understanding of 
the corporate characteristics of rumoured target firms. Consistent with what I have observed using 
EBIT, the profitability changes across firms. 
[Insert Table 3] 
There are 163 (representing 9% of the total) rumours whose publication date is after the earnings 
release date2 in the same quarter, while 91% of rumours are released prior to the quarterly earnings 
announcement date. Since the majority of rumours are released before quarterly earnings in the 
same quarter, and these rumours might have an influence on analyst earnings forecast, it is 
reasonable to estimate accounting accruals surrounding rumour publication date.  In addition, 
Erickson and Wang (1999) suggest firms might continuously engage in earnings management 
activities until a merger agreement is reached. Thereby, periods surround rumour date, both 
preceding and following, are likely to be subject to earnings management activities. As shown in 
Figure 1, for all rumoured target firms, the quarter with rumours following the earnings release is 
defined as quarter 0 (𝑄0). The first quarter prior to quarter 0 is defined as quarter -1(𝑄−1), two 
quarters prior to quarter 0 is defined as quarter -2 (𝑄−2). The first quarter after quarter 0 is 
considered as quarter 1 (𝑄1) and the second quarter as quarter 2 (𝑄2), etc.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
In Appendices Table 1, I present definitions of key variables, such as essential rumour categories, 
discretionary accruals and control variables utilized in multivariate analysis. Consistent with 
previous studies, I include return on assets (ROA), the leverage ratio, and the Altman's Z-score to 
                                                          
2 Quarterly earnings announcement date refers to the first date that quarterly earnings are reported. This data is 
available on Compustat as data date. 
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my multivariate analysis as control for firms’ characteristics (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005, 
Becker et al., 1998, Strebulaev and Yang, 2013, and Howe and Houston, 2015).  
5. Methodology  
The first step in determining whether firms engage in earnings management activities is to 
calculate accounting accruals. In this paper, I follow previous studies and use discretionary 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management. (Healy, 1985). 
Discretionary accruals are defined as the difference between total accruals and estimated accruals, 
which also refers to the residuals from the earnings management detective model. I measure total 
accruals the same way as Erickson and Wang (1999)3, who define it as the difference between net 
income and operating cash flows4. The expected accruals are estimated by using the Jones Model 
(Jones, 1991), which is utilized to control for the effects of changes in a firm’s economic 
circumstances on nondiscretionary accruals. The conventional linear discretionary accruals model 
estimated by Jones (1991) has been widely used in accounting literature to estimate abnormal 
accruals (Dechow 1994; Becker et al, 1998; Erickson and Wang, 1999). The Jones model controls 
for change in firm’s revenues and gross property, plant and equipment in order to eliminate 
expectable accrual-related changes. Working capital accruals are expected to increase with 
revenues, while depreciation are expected to have a positive relationship with property, plant and 
                                                          
3 According to Erickson and Wang, the calculation is also the same as Deangelo (1994) and close to Healy (1985). 
4 All the accounting fundamental data are from quarterly Compustat database. Net income is defined as quarterly 
Compustat data item 69. Followed Erickson and Wang (1999), operating cash flow is estimated by working capital 
from operation minus working capital accruals. Working capital from operations is the sum of income before 
extraordinary items (item 76), depreciation and amortization (item 77), extraordinary items and discounted operations 
(item 78), deferred taxes (item 79), equity in net loss (earnings) (item 80), sales of property, plant and equipment, gain 
or loss on sale of investment (item 102), and other funds from operation (item 76). Working capital accruals are 
calculated as the sum of changes in accounting payable (item 46), income tax payable (item 47), and other current 
liability (item 48), plus the sum of change in inventory (item 38), account receivable (item 37), and other current asset 
(item 39). For any item who calculated as a cumulative basis is adjusted to reflect quarterly value.  
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equipment. All variables from Jones model are scaled by the beginning of quarter book value of 
total assets to control for the influence of firm size. Therefore, consistent with the previous studies, 
I use the Jones Model to estimate the value of discretionary accruals. The discretionary accruals 
are measured as the residuals from the following model: 
                     𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
) + 𝛼2∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                  (1) 
where 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the total accruals for firm i in quarter t. ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the quarterly change in revenues 
(∆𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡) scaled by total assets (𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡) for firm i in quarter t, and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is property, plant, and 
equipment for firm i in quarter t (𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑡𝑡) scaled by total assets (𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡). 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is abnormal accruals 
for firm i at time t. The abnormal accrual is considered to be lower when differences between 
actual accruals and the expected accruals are higher.  
I show the detailed linear regression for the Jones Model in Table 4. The estimation uses 1,831 
initial rumours and 13,991 firm quarters over the period 2002 to 2011. The F-statistic for the model 
is 241.59 (<.0001). All the control variables from the Jones Model are statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Consistent with prior studies, I find a positive relationship between total accruals and 
change in firms’ revenue and a negative correlation between total accruals and gross property, 
plant and equipment. 
[Insert Table 4] 
In Table 5, I present the statistical description of rumoured target firm quarterly earnings 
management around rumour release quarters. Figure 2 uses the residuals from the Jones Model in 
Eq. (1) as the mean and median of quarterly earnings management of rumoured firms and plots 
them surround the rumour release date. Quarter 0 is the quarter in which firms immediately release 
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their quarterly earnings precede rumour publication. Quarter –t is the tth quarter preceding quarter 
0, and vice versa.  
The results in Figure 2 show that the level of median unexplained earnings is generally higher than 
the level of mean unexplained earnings and median unexplained earning for each quarter is above 
zero. This indicates that there might exist some negative outliers among unexplained earnings to 
drag the mean unexplained earnings down. A similar conclusion can be drawn from Table 5, the 
absolute value of quarterly minimum residuals is higher than that of maximum residuals, as well. 
Despite there are several quarters that the mean unexplained earnings are smaller than 0 (quarter -
2, 0, and 4), a lower minimum residual among peers always can be observed.  
The large scale of negative outliers and significant discrepancy between mean and median 
unexplained earnings can be attributed to firms’ consecutive financial losses, financial distress, 
large depreciation or amortization finance activities, or even an error in the sample. In order to 
avoid drawing conclusions based on outliers and errors in the data, I delete the top and bottom one 
percentile of unexplained earnings.  
[Insert Table 5] 
[Insert Figure 2] 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 All Rumour Categories 
To investigate whether the rumoured target firms in my sample dataset participate in earnings 
management activities around rumour publications I first analyze the unexpected earnings trends 
for eight quarters surrounding rumour publication date. I conduct a multivariate test to evaluate 
the time profile of accruals contributes to rumoured target firms’ earnings management. 
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Unexpected earnings are proxied by discretionary accruals, previously defined as the residuals 
estimated from the Jones Model shown in Eq. (1). To control for the variations caused by time 
changes I add year fixed effects to the regression shown below.  
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) argue that accruals are correlated with performance since firms 
who experienced unusual performance systematically have nonzero accruals. Therefore, I 
introduce return on assets (ROA) into my regression model to control for firm performance. I also 
control for leverage since higher levels of leverage may be associated with debt covenant violation 
and discretionary accrual management (Becker et al. 1998; Defond and Park, 1997).  In addition, 
Howe and Houston (2015) find that firms in financial distress engage in greater earnings 
management than non-distressed firms do. Z-score, an accounting ratio based on the bankruptcy 
model of Altman (1968, 2000), is utilized to assess the level of financial distress for all of the 
rumoured target firms in my sample. My focus in this subsection is to examine whether rumoured 
target firms engage in earnings manipulation activities and to find out the time profile of those 
activities. I presents Pearson correlation matrix of control variables in table 6 to estimate the 
strength of the correlation among the three variables. Normally, there raises collinearity concerns 
only when the correlation coefficient is over 0.5 or less than -0.5. Thereby, I keep all three control 
variables in my following regressions. 
[Insert Table 6] 
In order to examine how the pre-rumour and post-rumour quarters affect firms’ earnings 
management activities, I first integrated the quarters preceding to the rumour as 𝐻1, which equals 
to one for pre- rumour quarters (𝑄−2 𝑡𝑜 𝑄0) and zero otherwise, the quarters following to rumour 
quarter as 𝐷1, which set equal to one for post- rumour quarters (𝑄1 𝑡𝑜 𝑄2) and zero otherwise. My 
initial regression model is: 
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          𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻1 + 𝛽5𝐷1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2 𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (2) 
Where 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is unexplained earnings for firm i and in quarter t. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on assets for 
firm i in quarter t; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the leverage ratio for firm i in quarter t; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is Z-score for firm i in 
quarter t.  𝑌𝑦 is a dummy variable to control for year fixed effect which equals one for year y and 
zero otherwise. As I address in the previous section, to mitigate the effect of errors and outliers in 
the data, I delete the top and bottom 1% of unexpected earnings in my sample dataset. 
In addition, to run the regression in an integration level, I also analyze unexpected accruals for 
each quarter surrounding the rumour publication date to capture the accurate time profile of target 
rumour firms’ earnings management activities. My second multivariate analysis model is showed 
as below: 
              𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑄𝑡
2
𝑡=−2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2 𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (3) 
where Quarter –t is the tth quarter preceding quarter 0 and Quarter t is the tth quarter preceding 
quarter 0. Quarter 0 is the quarter in which firms immediately release their quarterly earnings 
preceding rumour publication. 
In Table 7, I present parameter estimates for the association between rumoured target firms’ 
unexplained earnings and pre and post rumour quarters from 2002 to 2011. In all the three models, 
coefficients on the control variables (return on assets, leverage ratio, and Z score) are significant 
at the 1% level. The coefficient for 𝐻1is positive and significant at the 10% level, which indicates 
that rumoured target firms significantly manipulate their earnings upward in the quarters preceding 
the date in which the rumour was first published, while the coefficient for 𝐷1, the post rumour 
quarters, is negative and insignificant. This seems to imply that companies subject to takeover 
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rumours are likely to inflate their earnings in the pre-rumour period, in an attempt to increase any 
forthcoming takeover offers. 
Similarly, the results from quarterly basis (Table 7) are consistent with previous findings. I observe 
a significant (at the 10% level) and positive coefficient for 𝑄−1 . This positive significant 
coefficient implies that in general, the rumoured target firms are likely to increase their earnings 
two quarters prior to the initial rumour announcement. The coefficient for 𝑄0 is positive but not 
significant. Earnings is one of the key variables for analysts from an investment bank or investment 
institutions to conduct firm valuation and due diligence. Gong et al (2008) state that managers may 
manipulate market expectations through gradual manipulation of reported earnings. Therefore 
earnings management activities might start early in the quarter. For the remaining quarters, the 
coefficients are mostly positive but insignificant. Overall, the results are consistent with Erickson 
and Wang (1999) study which find acquirers manipulate their earnings upward prior to corporate 
merger agreement announcement date in terms of stock swap merger. The results are also 
consistent with Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), Shivakumar (2000) and Gong, Louis and Sun 
(2008), who find firms significantly manage their earnings prior to major public corporate events 
such as initial public offerings, secondary public offerings, and open market repurchases. 
[Insert Table 7] 
6.2 Rumour Types 
It is interesting to estimate if the subgroup of takeover rumours with specific characteristic exhibit 
significantly influence on earnings management activities. In the initial rumour sample, Betton, 
Davis, and Walker (2017) cover a wide range of rumour sources, finding that the market reacts 
differently to each of those sources of information. Firms and management who are mentioned in 
or engage in those rumours would also differ in their reactions to rumours. Erickson and Wang 
18 
 
(1999) find a positive but insignificant relationship between target firms’ unexplained earnings 
and pre-merger quarters. They attribute this insignificant result to timing considerations. Acquirers 
can identify and plan out the time of acquisition, whereas the target firms are in a relatively passive 
position. In general, merger and acquisition deals are usually announced and agreed to within a 
quarter, and in most of the cases, target firms are only aware of the potential merger and acquisition 
opportunity when the acquirers reach out and initiate the negotiations. Therefore, in most of the 
transactions, target firms do not have sufficient time to manage their earnings. The potential 
determinants should ensure target firms' management flexibility or imply a forthcoming deal for 
the management team, despite the deal not yet coming publicly.  
When target firms initiate the rumours, however, they gain the ability to identify their acquirers 
and time the deals. In this case, the rumoured target firm has sufficient time to schedule and engage 
in earnings management activities. In addition, prior studies find that merger rumours associated 
with target-initiated deals might lend more credibility to an impending deal and be used by media 
as evidence to support rumours. Management teams of firms who release the potential deal 
rumours thus have strong incentives to manipulate their earnings upward in pre-rumour quarters. 
Similarly, if the rumour mentioned that the target firm hired an advisor or retained investment 
banking service, it might imply they are more prepared than target firms with shortly noticed 
negotiation, and have enough time to engage in earnings management activities. Besides, rumour 
related to hiring and retaining advisor service might indicate a forthcoming deal, despite a rumour 
not yet existing. Thereby, the management is incentivized to effectively protect the interests of 
shareholders and the frim. 
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) find managers who underperform (relative to market expectations) 
in consecutive quarters are likely to be fired. Besides, for most replaced managers from financially 
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distressed firms, the major reason is failing to meet analyst expectations (Negar and Sen, 2016). 
In addition, for managers of firms rumoured to be in financial distress, they are more likely to 
manage their earnings in order to avoid reporting the volatility of the earnings and losses than other 
firms (Howe and Houston 2015). Furthermore, the hubris hypothesis postulates that some 
managers believe that they can correctly identify the undervalued firms (Roll, 1986). Firms who 
are rumoured in financial distress are likely to be spotted by these managers and involve in a 
potential takeover deal. Thereby, rumoured target firms are likely to manipulate their earnings 
more in order to have stronger negotiating positions with potential bidders and protect the interests 
of their shareholders. 
To identify significant determinants of the earnings management, I run a cross-sectional regression 
to test the relationship between earnings management and various potential determinants (takeover 
rumours), including rumours initiated by target firms, rumours concerning the hiring of advisors, 
and rumours concerning financial distress. I then estimate the time profile of the firms’ earnings 
management activities to capture how firms transit certain incentive to actions. Consistent with the 
research model I build in section 5.1, I simply add the individual rumour category dummy variable 
(and the appropriate control variables) into the regression model. I employ the following model:  
      𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2 𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (4) 
       𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2 𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (5) 
        𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2 𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (6) 
     𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2 𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (7) 
where 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is unexplained earnings for firm i and quarter t. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on asset for 
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firm i in quarter t; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the leverage ratio for firm i in quarter t; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is Z-score for firm i in 
quarter t. 𝑌𝑦 is a dummy variable controlling for year fixed effect. It equals one for year y and zero 
otherwise. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to one when firm i initiated the buyout rumour 
and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖  is a dummy variable set to one when firm i is rumoured to be 
experiencing financial difficulties or financial distress and zero otherwise. 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 is a rumour 
dummy equals to one when firm i retained the services of an investment bank or advisor. 
𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖  is an integrated dummy, equals to one when 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 , 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖  or 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 is one and zero otherwise. To control for the downside effect caused by outliers and 
errors in the data, I remove the top and bottom 1% of unexplained earnings, return on assets, and 
leverage ratios from the sample. 
Table 8 reports the results of the regression of different rumour categories and pre and post rumour 
quarters on unexplained earnings. Consistent with the results from subsection 5.1, the coefficients 
of control variables (return on assets, leverage ratio and Z score) are statistically significant at the 
1% level. I observe significant negative coefficients for the leverage ratio and Z score, both of 
which are used to control for the firm's financial condition. These are included because firms who 
have high leverage ratios or are experiencing financial difficulties are expected to write off assets 
more frequently and exhibit larger negative discretionary accruals. For certain types of rumours, 
such as target-initiated rumours, financial distress rumours, and advisor being hired rumours, the 
rumoured target firms tend to inflate their earnings upward in pre-rumour quarters. Table 8 also 
reports significant positive coefficients for the target-initiated, financial distress, and advisor hired 
dummies at 1%, 5%, and 1% significant levels respectively. The target-initiated dummy has the 
largest scale; rumours initiated by the target lead to a 1.7% increase in unexplained earnings. 
Rumours involving financial distress are not economically significant as they lead to only a 0.7% 
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increase in unexplained earnings. Therefore, these three types of rumour might be the indicators 
that show the rumoured target firms would engage in earnings management activities and 
manipulate their earnings upward in pre-rumour quarters. The strong results for target-initiated 
and advisor hired dummies suggest that purposeful actions on the part of the target (e.g. starting a 
rumour or hiring advisors) are more closely tied to earnings management than the target’s financial 
position (e.g. financially distressed). Furthermore, I also combine these specific rumours together 
in Eq. (7), as an integrated dummy, 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖, that is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. These three rumours are thus significantly related to earnings management independently of 
the other rumour types. 
[Insert Table 8] 
In addition, I also add interaction terms to test whether firms with specific rumours tend to 
manipulate their earnings preceding the rumour publication quarter. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1  is the 
product of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖  and 𝐻1 ; 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1  is the product of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖  and 𝑄−1 ; 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1 is the product of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝐷𝑖 and 𝐻1; 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1 is the product of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 and 
𝑄−1; 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1 is the product of 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖  and 𝐻1; 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1 is the product of 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 
and 𝑄−1. 
For models A to F, shown in Table 9, the product of rumour categories and time indicator are 
separately added into the models. Because all the rumour indicators and time indicators are dummy 
variables, auto-correlation may be a problem if I keep all the variables in the regression. Therefore, 
I only keep the product since my main focus is to examine whether specific rumour firms 
manipulate their earnings upward at pre-rumour quarters. Table 9 reports the results of parameter 
estimation from ordinary least regression. The coefficients for most of the interaction terms are 
significant (1%) and positive, which indicates that firms who start the rumour, are rumoured to be 
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in financial distress, and are rumoured to be hiring advisor are likely to inflate their earning in pre-
rumour periods, which is consistent with my previous finding. for the product of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 and 𝐻1, 
the p-value is still relatively small (0.1157), but not significant. In conclusion, firms which are the 
subject of certain categories of rumours are likely to manage their earnings upward in pre-rumour 
quarters. 
[Insert Table 9] 
6.3 Matched Sample 
In order to ensure my results are not driven by outliers, I provide additional non-parametric 
analyses of unexplained earnings through a matched sample of control firms. These firms are listed 
on Compustat and are matched by three-digit SIC. I also make sure the sizes of matched firms are 
similar to those of the rumoured firms for 30% of the matched sample. For the rest of the sample, 
I match by book-to-market ratio. 
Since the difference in unexplained earnings between the two samples is normally distributed 
(Figure 3), I conduct a Student's t-test to examine whether the unexplained earnings from my 
rumour sample are significantly different from that of the matched sample. At the same time, I 
also investigate the scale of unexplained earnings from both samples to test whether the 
unexplained earnings of rumoured target firms have a larger scale than match sample firms. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
Table 10 presents results of mean unexplained earnings difference test under multiple settings. In 
Panel A, I show the t statistic of the mean difference of unexplained earnings from both samples 
in the quarters prior to quarter 0. The mean difference is positive and significant at the 1% level 
(with a p-value of 0.004). This indicates that, in general, rumoured target firms have greater 
unexplained earnings in pre-rumour quarters than matched sample firms. In Panel B, I exclude 
23 
 
firms who have initiated rumours, are rumoured to be in financial distress and rumoured to be 
hiring merger and acquisition advisors. The unexplained earnings for rumoured target firms are 
significantly greater than that of matched firms. Overall, the wide discrepancy of the mean 
difference on unexplained earnings points out the potential influence of heightened media and 
investor awareness.  
In addition, I also examine whether the specific three rumour types excluded from Panel B have a 
stronger impact than remaining rumours. I conduct the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to check the 
normality of the rumour sample. Since the earnings management is not normally distributed in the 
sample period, a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is used to test median differences between the two 
groups. Panel C reports the results of two-tailed Wilicoxon Rank Sum test. The median difference 
between 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 firms and other rumour firms are significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level, and the median difference is positive. In conclusion, the three rumour types (target 
initiated rumours, targets in distress rumours, and rumours mentioning the hiring of a financial 
advisor) have a stronger impact on earnings management than other rumours combined. This 
provides evidence that in cases in which rumours are more easily anticipated by the target firms, 
earnings management is more severe, in accordance with my second hypothesis.  
I also build a sample which comprises rumoured firms and a one-to-one matched sample. A 
dummy variable, 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 , is created to identify rumour firms. I compared the earnings 
management for rumour firms with that for matched firms in the same time period by regressing 
𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 on firms’ unexplained earnings while controlling for the return on assets, leverage, and the 
Z-score. As the results show in Panel D, compared with the matched firm, rumoured target firms 
have an increased 0.2% in earnings management, significant at the 10% level. 
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 [Insert Table 10] 
7. Robustness Test 
7.1 Alternative Measure of Earnings Management 
The previous analysis was conducted using the Jones Model to estimate earnings management. As 
several studies have mentioned the tendency of the Jones Model to measure discretionary accruals 
as an error term when discretion is exercised over revenue recognition, I perform a robustness 
check. Specifically, I use the Modified Jones Model in coordination with the performance-matched 
approach as an alternative to estimate the discretionary accruals for rumoured target firms. 
Consistent with my previous method, I use abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings management. 
Following Gong, Louis and Sun (2008) and Louis, Robinson, and Sbaraglia (2008), I estimate 
abnormal accruals using the residual of the Modified Jones model shown below: 
                          𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                       (8) 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡5 is total accruals for firm i in quarter t. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the total asset at the beginning 
quarter for firm i in quarter t. ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the quarterly change in sales for firm i in quarter t. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
is the plant property and equipment at the beginning quarter for firm i in quarter t. 𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the lag 
of total accruals for firm i in quarter t. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the residual from the regression. Gong, Louis and Sun 
(2008) scaled the model by the total assets at the beginning quarter. This approach is used in my 
model and results in a column of ones to estimate the intercept. In order to reduce the effect of 
                                                          
5 Since my sample period starts from 2002, when cash flow statements are widely available, I measure total 
accruals based on changes in cash flows statement data instead of the balance sheet.   
Specifically, total accruals the change in current assets minus current liability minus change in cash and 





outliers and errors in the data, they delete the top and bottom one percentile of deflated variables. 
In addition, they estimate the accruals for each two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
code that has more than 20 observations. 
Kothari et al. (2005) find that the performance matching approach using current year return on 
assets is superior to including an independent variable in a discretionary accruals regression. 
Therefore, I create five portfolios with at least four firms each by sorting the data into quintiles 
based on ROA from the same quarter in the previous year. Following Louis (2004), the abnormal 
accruals for firms are the difference between rumoured target firms’ discretionary accruals and the 
median discretionary accruals from its respective industry performance-matched portfolio. 
Following my previous research model, I keep return on assets, leverage ratio, and Z score as my 
control variables. I also add year fixed effects to control for the variations across the sample period. 
Table 11 uses an alternative method to present the parameter estimation results for my first 
hypothesis, which is to examine whether and when rumoured target firms engage in earnings 
management activities. Most of the control variables are significant, with one exception: the Z-
score, which is used to control for firms’ levels of financial distress. As in previous tests, the 
quarters prior to the rumour date are positively significant. The integrated quarters dummy and 
one quarter before rumour announcement date (𝑄−1) variables are significant at the 10% level.  
The results support my previous finding: rumoured target firms tend to inflate their earnings in the 
pre-rumour period and do so within two quarters before the date in which the rumour is published. 
In addition, I test how certain types of rumours, namely target-initiated rumours financial distress 
rumours, and advisor hired rumours, affect firms’ earnings management activities through the 
alternative methodology. Table 12 shows the results of whether and when rumours target firms 
manipulate their earnings upwards. Consistent with my previous findings, firms initiating the 
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rumours or rumoured to be in financial distress have a significant and positive relationship with 
firms’ unexplained earnings at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. To this extent, when firms are 
rumoured to be in financial distress, are themselves initiating rumours with potential bidders, or 
retaining investment banking services, targets are likely to engage in earnings management 
activities. I also find a positive and significant relationship between firms’ earnings management 
levels and pre-merger quarters at both an integrated and quarterly level. Consistent with previous 
findings, I find significant (10%) and positive coefficients for 𝐻1 and 𝑄−1.  
[Insert Table 11] 
[Insert Table 12] 
7.1 Endogeneity   
A possible remaining concern relates to endogeneity, in that rumor publications may be a result of 
corporate earnings management activities (rather than the hypothesized causality of earnings 
management occurring due to the anticipation of takeover bids). To mitigate this concern, I remove 
from the sample instances in which this effect is likely to be strongest; namely, those firms 
experiencing significant share price movements on the public release of earnings which have been 
significantly managed upward. Specifically, I calculate cumulative abnormal returns for a 7 day 
period following the earnings release, and remove those 127 firms for which such returns are 
significant. The remaining 1,704 firms are used as a subsample to repeat the prior analysis of 
Tables 7 and 8, with results presented in Tables 13 and 14.  
Results are robust:  potential takeover targets manipulate their earnings upward in the pre-rumour 
periods and when rumours are easily anticipated, such as target initiated rumours, financial distress 
rumours and retaining advisory service rumours. The only qualitative difference in results is in 
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Table 13 Model B, with significant earnings management activity occurring one quarter prior than 
before, in Q-2. 
[Insert Table 13] 
[Insert Table 14] 
Overall, these tests confirm our general results, which are robust to the choice of the earnings 
management estimation method and the exclusion of earning quarters with significant abnormal 
returns. Results indicate that rumoured target firms tend to manage their earnings upwards in pre-
rumour quarters, with stronger results when such rumours are more easily anticipated by the 
sample firms. 
8. Conclusion 
This study investigates whether firms manage earnings in proximity to the initial published release 
of rumours which implicate the firm as a takeover target. My first hypothesis is that firms manage 
their earnings upwards, while my second hypothesis is that rumours which are easier for target 
firm managers to anticipate provide stronger evidence of earnings management. Following 
Erickson and Wang (1999), I apply the Jones Model (Jones, 1991) to a unique sample of 1,831 
takeover rumours from 2002 to 2011 to estimate firms’ total accruals, and use the difference 
between total accruals and estimated accruals to proxy for earnings management. 
I find strong evidence that firms publicized as potential takeover targets manipulate their earnings 
upward in the pre-rumour periods. The results are robust to both a matched sample as well as to 
an alternative method of calculating discretionary accruals. While prior studies do not find 
evidence of earnings management within target firms prior to takeover announcements, this is 
likely due to a limited ability to do so once negotiations are underway (Erickson and Wang, 1999). 
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Our results imply that such activity is occurring up to two quarters prior to the initial publication 
of a takeover rumour, which itself occurs on average 181 days prior to any upcoming takeover 
announcement. The results are particularly strong when target firms are more likely to be aware of 
impending takeover possibilities (i.e., when they themselves create the rumour, are rumoured to 
be experiencing financial distress or are rumoured to retain the service of an investment bank).   
In sum, results are consistent with firms managing earnings upwards well in advance of takeover 
negotiations and before their opportunity to do so becomes constrained. This effect appears 




Ahern, K. R., & Sosyura, D. (2014). Who writes the news? Corporate press releases during merger 
negotiations. The Journal of Finance, 69(1), 241-291. 
Ahern, K. R., & Sosyura, D. (2015). Rumour has it: Sensationalism in financial media. The Review 
of Financial Studies, 28(7), 2050-2093. 
Altman, E. I. (2000). Predicting financial distress of companies: revisiting the Z-score and ZETA 
models. Stern School of Business, New York University, 9-12. 
Baik, B., Kang, J. K., & Morton, R. M. (2007). Earnings management in takeovers of privately 
held targets. 
Becker, C. L., DeFond, M. L., Jiambalvo, J., & Subramanyam, K. R. (1998). The effect of audit 
quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 15(1), 1-24. 
Betton, S., Davis, F. and Walker, T., (2017). Rumour Rationales: The impact of message 
justification on article credibility. Working paper. 
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and 
losses. Journal of Eccounting and Economics, 24(1), 99-126. 
DeAngelo, L. E. (1986). Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of 
management buyouts of public stockholders. Accounting Review, 400-420. 
Dechow, P. M. (1994). Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: The 
role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18(1), 3-42. 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1995). Detecting earnings 
management. Accounting Review, 193-225. 
DeFond, M. L., & Park, C. W. (1997). Smoothing income in anticipation of future 
earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23(2), 115-139. 
Easterwood, C. M. (2011). Takeovers and incentives for earnings management: an empirical 
analysis. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 14(1), 29-48. 
Erickson, M., & Wang, S. W. (1999). Earnings management by acquiring firms in stock for stock 
mergers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27(2), 149-176. 
Faccio, M., & Masulis, R. W. (2005). The choice of payment method in European mergers and 
acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1345-1388. 
Gong, G., Louis, H., & Sun, A. X. (2008). Earnings management and firm performance following 
open‐market repurchases. The Journal of Finance, 63(2), 947-986. 
30 
 
Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 7(1-3), 85-107. 
Howe, J. S., & Houston, R. (2015). Earnings Management, Earnings Surprises, and Distressed 
Firms. Accounting and Finance Research, 5(1), 64. 
Huberman, G., & Regev, T. (2001). Contagious speculation and a cure for cancer: A nonevent that 
made stock prices soar. The Journal of Finance, 56(1), 387-396. 
Jarrell, G. A., & Poulsen, A. B. (1989). Stock trading before the announcement of tender offers: 
insider trading or market anticipation? Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 5(2), 225-248. 
Jarrell, G. A., & Poulsen, A. B. (1989). The returns to acquiring firms in tender offers: Evidence 
from three decades. Financial Management, 12-19. 
Jensen, M. C. (2005). Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management, 34(1), 5-19. 
Jiraporn, P., Miller, G. A., Yoon, S. S., & Kim, Y. S. (2008). Is earnings management opportunistic 
or beneficial? An agency theory perspective. International Review of Financial Analysis, 17(3), 
622-634. 
Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 193-228. 
Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations.  Journal of 
Accounting Research, 193-228. 
Jones, K. L., Krishnan, G. V., & Melendrez, K. D. (2008). Do models of discretionary accruals 
detect actual cases of fraudulent and restated earnings? An empirical analysis. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 25(2), 499-531. 
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., & Wasley, C. E. (2005). Performance matched discretionary accrual 
measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1), 163-197. 
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., & Wasley, C. E. (2005). Performance matched discretionary accrual 
measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1), 163-197. 
Lie, E. (2005). Operating performance following open market share repurchase 
announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(3), 411-436. 
Louis, H. (2004). Earnings management and the market performance of acquiring firms. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 74(1), 121-148. 
Louis, H., Robinson, D., & Sbaraglia, A. (2008). An integrated analysis of the association between 
accrual disclosure and the abnormal accrual anomaly. Review of Accounting Studies, 13(1), 23-54. 
31 
 
Meulbroek, L. K. (1992). An empirical analysis of illegal insider trading. The Journal of 
Finance, 47(5), 1661-1699. 
Perry, S. E., & Williams, T. H. (1994). Earnings management preceding management buyout 
offers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18(2), 157-179. 
Pound, J., & Zeckhauser, R. (1990). Clearly heard on the street: The effect of takeover rumours on 
stock prices. Journal of Business, 291-308. 
Roll, R. (1986). The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business, 197-216. 
Schwert, G. W. (1996). Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 41(2), 153-192 
Strebulaev, I. A., & Yang, B. (2013). The mystery of zero-leverage firms. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 109(1), 1-23. 
Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., & Wong, T. J. (1998). Earnings management and the long‐run market 
performance of initial public offerings. The Journal of Finance, 53(6), 1935-1974. 
Tetlock, P. C. (2007). Giving content to investor sentiment: The role of media in the stock 
market. The Journal of Finance, 62(3), 1139-1168. 
Zivney, T. L., Bertin, W. J., & Torabzadeh, K. M. (1996). Overreaction to takeover 





Tables and Figures  
Table 1 
Industry and event-year distribution for a sample of 1831 takeover rumours firms from 
2002-2011  
 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Industry 
Industry  Frequency Percent 
Aircraft 9 0.49% 
Apparel 27 1.47% 
Automobiles and Transportation 21 1.15% 
Beer & Liquor 4 0.22% 
Business Services 304 16.60% 
Business Supplies 12 0.66% 
Chemicals 31 1.69% 
Coal 14 0.76% 
Communication 110 6.01% 
Computers 121 6.61% 
Construction 20 1.09% 
Construction Mate 20 1.09% 
Consumer Goods 28 1.53% 
Electrical Equipment 14 0.76% 
Electronic Equipment 119 6.50% 
Entertainment 52 2.84% 
Food Products 41 2.24% 
Healthcare 17 0.93% 
Machinery 33 1.80% 
Measuring  21 1.15% 
Medical Equipment 44 2.40% 
Non-Metallic 30 1.64% 
Personal Services 14 0.76% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 146 7.97% 
Pharmaceutical Product 209 11.41% 
Precious Metals 12 0.66% 
Printing and Publication 8 0.44% 
Recreation 8 0.44% 
Restaurants, Hotel 29 1.58% 
Retail 147 8.03% 
Rubber and Plastic 7 0.38% 
Steel Works Etc. 56 3.06% 
Tobacco Products 9 0.49% 
Trading 24 1.31% 
Transportation 38 2.08% 
Utilities 8 0.44% 
Wholesale 24 1.31% 





Panel B: Sample and SDC Deals Distribution by Year 




2002 40 2.00% 28,564 
2003 68 4.00% 31,278 
2004 95 5.00% 34,127 
2005 96 5.00% 37,036 
2006 161 9.00% 42,997 
2007 156 9.00% 49,334 
2008 171 9.00% 47,923 
2009 324 18.00% 44,056 
2010 323 18.00% 46,556 
2011 397 22.00% 47,906 
Total 1,831 100.00% 409,777 
Note: An increasing number of rumours by year may be a result of media coverage 






Statistical summary of 21 rumour characteristics from 2002-2011 
 
Rumour Character 2002-2007 2008-2009 2010-2011 Total 
Analyst Report 242 139 185 566 
Advisor Hired 93 49 57 199 
Bidder Denied 12 7 3 22 
Bidder Mentioned 324 210 235 769 
Block Purchase 30 15 17 62 
Financing Source 11 9 10 30 
Industry Activity 108 68 62 238 
Insider Cited 104 50 84 238 
Mgmt Concerns 26 7 11 44 
Options Increased 54 130 273 457 
PE Fund Involved 101 40 69 210 
Synergy Cited 31 21 22 74 
Takeover Chatter 54 161 315 530 
Target Denied 7 3 1 11 
Target Distress 42 21 5 68 
Target Initiated 147 78 67 292 
Under valued 123 100 112 335 
Unusual Activity 13 8 13 34 
Informative 232 106 119 457 
Accurate 174 78 115 367 
Speculative 10 81 232 323 






Summary statistical description for the sample of 1831 initial rumours from 2002-2011 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std Dev 
Sales 1,414.38 363.04 85,329.00 0 3,748.82 
Assets - Total 6,433.39 1,985.80 286,592.00 13.50 14,951.04 
Earnings(EBIT) 148.50 30.40 10,496.00 -6,077.00 529.38 
Earnings (EBITDA) 221.68 56.59 12,416.00 -5,424.00 668.92 
Market Value  5,890.78 2,147.56 127,983.68 2.01 10,316.25 
Note: Sales, total assets, earnings and market value are quarterly data from Compustat – 
Capital IQ for the rumour publication quarter. 




Table 4  
Parameter estimation of Jones Model 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
) + 𝛼2∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡  is the total accruals for firm i in quarter t. ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the quarterly change in revenues 
(∆𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡) scaled by total assets (𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡) for firm i in quarter t, and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is property, plant, and 
equipment for firm i in quarter t (𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑡𝑡) scaled by total assets (𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡). The 𝜀𝑖,𝑡is abnormal accruals 
for firm i at time t. The estimation use sample of 1,831 initial rumoured target firms from 2002-
2011.  
Figures in parentheses represent P-value. Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, 
**, and ***, respectively. 
 Total Accruals 
Intercept -0. 012 
 (<.0001)*** 
1/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 -0. 640 
 (<.0001)*** 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 0. 229 
 (<.0001)*** 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 -0. 007 
 (0.071)* 





Table 5  
Descriptive statistics of earnings management around rumour publication date 
Quarter 0 is the first quarter with released earning immediately preceding to rumour date. Quarter 
– t is the tth quarter preceding quarter 0, Quarter t is the tth quarter following quarter 0. N Obs is 
the number of observations for each quarter. It shows the number of firms with available data. Std. 




N Obs Median Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
-4 1,821 0.0061 0.0029 0.0928 -1.1636 0.9018 
-3 1,833 0.0065 0.0015 0.0848 -1.0513 0.6078 
-2 1,847 0.0067 0.0002 0.0907 -1.9004 0.5841 
-1 1,831 0.0069 0.0023 0.1202 -2.3538 1.5199 
0 1,811 0.0060 -0.0037 0.1764 -5.9647 1.6199 
1 1,791 0.0061 -0.0001 0.0957 -1.5901 0.8225 
2 1,650 0.0061 0.0029 0.0967 -1.3850 0.9614 
3 1,508 0.0065 -0.0002 0.1600 -3.8762 1.9932 













Return on Assets 1 -0.073 0.163 
Leverage Ratio -0.073 1 -0.322 





Association between rumoured target firms’ unexplained earnings and pre and post rumour 
quarters 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐴:    𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻1 + 𝛽5𝐷1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 






𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐶:    𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑄−1 + 𝛽5𝑄0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is unexplained earnings for firm i and quarter t. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on asset for firm i in quarter t; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
is leverage ratio for firm i in quarter t; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is Z-score for firm i in quarter t.  𝐻1 equals to one for pre-rumour 
quarter and zero otherwise. 𝐷1 sets equal to one for post-rumour quarters and zero otherwise. Quarter 0 is the 
quarter which firms immediately release their quarterly earnings before rumour publication. Quarter – t is the tth 
quarter preceding quarter 0, Quarter t is the tth quarter following quarter 0. 𝑌𝑦 is a dummy variable to control for 
year fixed effect. It equals to one for year y and zero otherwise. The estimation use sample of 1,831 takeover 
rumour from 2002-2011.  




Model A Model B Model C 
Intercept 0.010 0.010 0.012 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.007)*** 
Return on Assets 0.234 0.234 0.234 
 (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** 
Leverage Ratio -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (<.0001)*** 
Z Score -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.0073)*** 
𝐻1 0.002 
  
 (0.0853)*   
𝐷1 -0.001   
 (0.300)   
𝑄−2 
 0.002  
  (0.178)  
𝑄−1 
 0.003 0.003 
  (0.074)* (0.050)** 
𝑄0 
 0.001 0.001 
  (0.836) (0.800) 
𝑄1 
 -0.002  
  (0.187)  
𝑄2 
 -0.001  
  (0.816)  
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 Yes Yes Yes 
N.Obs 11,475 11,475 11,475 




Correlation between rumoured target firms’ unexplained earnings and rumour type 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐴: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐵: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐶: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐷: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is unexplained earnings for firm i and quarter t. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on asset for firm i in quarter t; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
is leverage ratio for firm i in quarter t; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is Z-score for firm i in quarter t. Quarter 0 is the quarter which firms 
immediately release their quarterly earnings before rumour publication. Quarter –t is the tth quarter preceding 
quarter 0, Quarter t is the tth quarter following quarter 0.  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to one when 
firm i starts the rumour in terms of buyout and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to one when 
firms i rumoured experiencing financial difficulties or financial distress in the context of merger and acquisitions 
and zero otherwise. 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 is a rumour dummy equals to one when firm i retained the services of investment 
bank or advisor. 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖  is an integrated dummy equal to one when 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 , 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖  or 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 is one and zero otherwise. The estimation uses a sample of 1,831 takeover rumour from 2002-2011.  




Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Intercept 0.006 0.010 0. 009 0.007 
 (0.049)** (0.007)*** (0.0084)*** (0.031)** 
Return on Assets 0.445 0.427 0. 431 0.531 
 (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** 
Leverage Ratio -0.011 -0.010 -0. 010 -0.016 
 (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** 
Z Score -0.031 -0.035 -0. 036 -0.043 
 (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 0.017 
   
 (<.0001)***    
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 
 0.007   
  (0.013)**   
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 
  0. 013  
   (<.0001)***  
𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖 
   0.014 
    (<.0001)*** 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N.Obs 11,475 11,475 11,475 11,475 





Correlation between rumoured target firms’ unexplained earnings and different rumour 
type with interaction terms 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐴: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐵: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐶: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐷: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1  + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐸: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷1 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐹: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1  + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is unexplained earnings for firm i and quarter t. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on asset for firm i in quarter t; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
is leverage ratio for firm i in quarter t; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is Z-score for firm i in quarter t.  𝐻𝑖,𝑡 equals to one for pre-rumour 
quarter and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 set equal to one for post-rumour quarters and zero otherwise. Quarter 0 is the 
quarter which firms immediately release their quarterly earnings before rumour publication. Quarter – t is the tth 
quarter preceding quarter 0, Quarter t is the tth quarter following quarter 0.   𝑌𝑦 is a dummy variable to control 
for year fixed effect. It equals to one for year y and zero otherwise. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 
one when firm i starts the rumour in terms of buyout and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 is a dummy variable set to 
one when firms i rumoured experiencing financial difficulties or financial distress in the context of merger and 
acquisitions and zero otherwise. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1 is the product of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 and 𝐻1; 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1 is 
the product of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 and 𝑄−1; 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1 is the product of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 and 𝐻1; 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1 is the 
product of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 and 𝑄−1. For Eq. (4) to Eq. (7), I utilize the product of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1,𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑄−1, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1 and 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1 to replace 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 ,  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 , 𝐻1, and 𝑄−1 in separate level. 
The estimation uses a sample of 11,831 takeover rumour from 2002-2011.  




Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F 
Intercept 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 
 (0.024)** (0.012)** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Return on Assets 0.432 0.429 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.424 
 (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** 
Leverage Ratio -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 
 (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** 
Z Score -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.038 -0.0389 
 (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** 
𝐷1 0.002 
 0.001  0.001  
 (0.209)  (0.607)  (0.400)  
𝑄−2 
 0.002  0.001  0.002 
  (0.259)  (0.445)  (0.301) 
𝑄0 
 -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
42 
 
  (0.891)  (0.614)  (0.790) 
𝑄1 
 0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.829)  (0.893)  (0.994) 
𝑄2 
 0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.179)  (0.313)  (0.273) 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1 0.0201 
     
 (<.0001)***      
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1 
 0.020     
  (<.0001)***     
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1 
  0.008    
   (0.116)    
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1 
   0.019   
    (<.0001)***   
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝐻1 
    0.013  
     (<.0001)***  
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑄−1 
     0.011 
      (0.010)*** 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N.Obs 11,475 11,475 11,475 11,475 11,475 11,475 




Mean and Median Difference Test in Earnings Management for Subgroup 
The mean difference is the mean of difference between unexplained earnings, which estimated from Jones 
Model, from rumoured target firms and unexplained earnings from match sample firms from 2001 to 2011.  
Figures in parentheses represent P-value. Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
Panel A: Unexplained earnings mean difference between rumour and   
                   matched sample 
Mean Difference Standard Deviation t Value P value 
0.003 0.096 2.870 0.004*** 
    
Panel B: Excluding rumours initiated by targets, indicating distress, and  
                indicating a financial advisor was hired 
Mean Difference Standard Deviation t Value P value 
0.002 0.083 2.010 0.036** 
 
Panel C: Median difference in earnings management by rumour type 
Median Difference Z Value P value 
0.003 3.644 0.0001*** 
 
Panel D: Parameter Estimation Using Combination of Rumour Sample and Match Sample 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is unexplained earnings for firm i and quarter t. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on asset for firm i in quarter t; 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is leverage ratio for firm i in quarter t; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is Z-score for firm i in quarter t. 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 is an 
dummy variable set equal to one when 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 is a rumoured target firm and zero otherwise. The estimation 
uses a combination of rumour sample and matched sample firms from 2002-2011. Figures in parentheses 
represent P-values. Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Coefficient   Unexplained Earnings  
Intercept -0.026 
 (<.0001)*** 
Return on Assets 0.124 
 (<.0001)*** 
Leverage Ratio 0.009 
 (<.0001)*** 




𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 Yes 
N.Obs 17974 




Association between rumoured target firms’ unexplained earnings and pre and post rumour 
quarters by using an alternative method to calculate and adjust discretionary accruals 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐴:    𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻1 + 𝛽5𝐷1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 






𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is unexplained earnings for firm i and quarter t. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on asset for firm i in quarter t; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
is leverage ratio for firm i in quarter t; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is Z-score for firm i in quarter t.  𝐻𝑖,𝑡 equals to one for pre-rumour 
quarter and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 set equal to one for post-rumour quarters and zero otherwise. Quarter 0 is the 
quarter which firms immediately release their quarterly earnings before rumour publication. Quarter – t is the tth 
quarter preceding quarter 0, Quarter t is the tth quarter following quarter 0.   𝑌𝑦 is a dummy variable to control 
for year fixed effect. It equals to one for year y and zero otherwise. The estimation use sample of 1,831 takeover 
rumour from 2002-2011.  




Model A Model B 
Intercept -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.006)*** (0.091)* 
Return on Assets 0.053 0.041 
 (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** 
Leverage Ratio 0.004 0.003 
 (0.005)*** (0.007)*** 
Z Score 0.001 0.002 
 (0.728) (0.684) 
𝐻1 0.002 
 
 (0.061)*  
𝐷1 0.001 
 
 (0.267)  
𝑄−2 
 0.001 
  (0.222) 
𝑄−1 
 0.002 
  (0.09)* 
𝑄0 
 -0.004 
  (0.971) 
𝑄1 
 0.001 
  (0.266) 
𝑄2 
 0.002 
  (0.128) 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 Yes Yes 
N.Obs 11,475 11,475 




Correlation between rumoured target firms’ unexplained earnings and different rumour 
type by using an alternative method to calculate and adjust discretionary accruals 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐴: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐵: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐶: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐷: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is unexplained earnings for firm i and quarter t. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on asset for firm i in quarter t; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
is leverage ratio for firm i in quarter t; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is Z-score for firm i in quarter t. Quarter 0 is the quarter which firms 
immediately release their quarterly earnings before rumour publication. Quarter – t is the tth quarter preceding 
quarter 0, Quarter t is the tth quarter following quarter 0.  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to one when 
firm i starts the rumour in terms of buyout and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to one when 
firms i rumoured experiencing financial difficulties or financial distress in the context of merger and acquisitions 
and zero otherwise. 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 is a rumour dummy equals to one when firm i retained the services of investment 
bank or advisor. 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖  is an integrated dummy equal to one when 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 , 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖  or 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 is one and zero otherwise. The estimation uses a sample of 1,831 takeover rumour from 2002-2011.  




Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Intercept -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0. 008 
 (0.002)*** (0.0067)*** (0.005)*** (0. 002)** 
Return on Assets 0.055 0.053 0.053 0. 054 
 (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0. 0054)*** 
Leverage Ratio 0.004 0.004 0.004 0. 004 
 (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (<.0001)*** 
Z Score 0.002 0.002 0.002 0. 002 
 (0.567) (0.650) (0.592) (0. 563) 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 0.003 
 0.0028  
 (0.001)*  (0.009)  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 
 0.003   
  (0.082)*   
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 
  0.003  
   (0.009)***  
𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖    0.009 
    (0. 001)*** 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N.Obs 11,475 11,475 11,475 11,475 




Association between rumoured target firms’ unexplained earnings and pre and post rumour 
quarters by excluding significant earnings releasing events 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐴:    𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻1 + 𝛽5𝐷1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 






𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is unexplained earnings for firm i and quarter t. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on asset for firm i in quarter t; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
is leverage ratio for firm i in quarter t; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is Z-score for firm i in quarter t.  𝐻𝑖,𝑡 equals to one for pre-rumour 
quarter and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 set equal to one for post-rumour quarters and zero otherwise. Quarter 0 is the 
quarter which firms immediately release their quarterly earnings before rumour publication. Quarter – t is the tth 
quarter preceding quarter 0, Quarter t is the tth quarter following quarter 0.   𝑌𝑦 is a dummy variable to control 
for year fixed effect. It equals to one for year y and zero otherwise. The estimation use sample of 1,704 takeover 
rumour from 2002-2011.  




Model A Model B 
Intercept 0.004 0.004 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Return on Assets 0.221 0.221 
 (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** 
Leverage Ratio -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.112) (0.110) 
Z Score -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.640)  
𝐻1 0.002 
 
 (0.031)**  
𝐷1 0.001 
 
 (0.4519)  
𝑄−2  0.003 
 
 (0.060)* 
𝑄−1  0.003 
  (0.075)* 
𝑄0 
 0.001 
  (0.465) 
𝑄1 
 0.002 
  (0.277) 
𝑄2 
 0.000 
  (0.931) 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡   
N.Obs 10,601 10,601 





Correlation between rumoured target firms’ unexplained earnings and different rumour 
type by excluding significant earnings releasing events 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐴: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐵: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐶: 𝑈𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑦
10
𝑦=2
𝑌𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is unexplained earnings for firm i and quarter t. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on asset for firm i in quarter t; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
is leverage ratio for firm i in quarter t; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is Z-score for firm i in quarter t. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable 
equal to one when firm i starts the rumour in terms of buyout and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 is a dummy variable 
equal to one when firms i rumoured experiencing financial distress or financial distress in the context of merger 
and acquisitions and zero otherwise. 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 is a rumour dummy equals to one when firm i retained the services 
of investment bank or advisor. The estimation uses a sample of 1,704 initial takeover rumour from 2002-2011.  




Model A Model B Model C 
Intercept 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 (0.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0002)*** 
Return on Assets 0.231 0.222 0.227 
 (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** 
Leverage Ratio -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.054)* (0.09)* (0.1041) 
Z Score -0.009 -0.028 -0.002 
 (0.8969) (0.6781) (0.9712) 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 0.009   
 (<.0001)***   
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 
 0.006  
  (0.037)**  
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖 
  0.011 
   (<.0001)*** 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 Yes Yes Yes 
N.Obs 10601 10601 10601 






Quarter dummy timeline 
 
For all sample rumoured target firms, the first quarter of earnings releasement date preceding to 
rumours date is defined as quarter 0 (𝑄0). The first quarter prior to quarter 0 is defined as quarter 
-1(𝑄−1), two quarter prior to quarter 0 is defined as quarter -2 (𝑄−2). The first quarter after quarter 






Figure 2  
Median and mean earnings management around rumour publication date  
Quarter 0 represents the quarter which the reported quarterly earnings is immediately prior to 
rumour publication. Quarter –t is the tth quarter preceding the rumour releasing quarter, vice versa. 
Earnings management is computed as the difference between total accruals and discretionary 
accruals estimated from Jones Model. The green line stands for the mean of earnings management 








Distribution of difference of earnings management from rumour sample and match sample 
 
The difference is unexplained earnings, which estimated from Jones Model, from rumoured target 
firms minus unexplained earnings from match sample firms.  
The red line shows a Kernel Density Distribution of the difference of earnings management 
between rumour sample and match sample. 
The blue line shows a Normal Distribution of the difference of earnings management between 
rumour sample and match sample. 
The blue box displays the frequency of the difference of earnings management between rumour 









Key Variable Definitions 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Net Income divided by total assets. 
Leverage Ratio 
The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total 
assets. 
Z-score 
The sum of 1.2 times working capital over total assets, 1.4 times retained 
earnings over total assets, 3.3 times earnings before interests and taxes 
over total assets, 0.6 times market value of equity over book value of total 
liabilities, and sales over total assets. 
Total Accruals 
Total accruals refers to the difference between net income and operating 
cash flow. Followed Erickson and Wang (1999), operating cash flow is 
estimated by working capital from operation minus working capital 
accruals. Working capital from operations is the sum of income before 
extraordinary items (item 76), depreciations and amortization (item 77), 
extraordinary items and discounted operations (item 78), deferred taxes 
(item 79), equity in net loss (earnings) (item 80), sales of property, plant 
and equipment, gain or loss of sale of investment (item 102), and other 
funds from operation (item 76). Working capital accruals are calculated 
as the sum of changes in accounting payable (item 46), income tax 
payable (item 47), and other current liability (item 48), plus the sum of 
change in inventory (item 38), account receivable (item 37), and other 
current asset (item 39). For any item who calculated as a cumulative basis 
is adjust to reflect quarterly value. 
Discretionary Accruals 
The difference between total accruals and estimated total accruals 
predicted by Jones Model. 
𝑄𝑡 
Quarter 0 is the quarter which firms immediately release their quarterly 
earnings before rumour publication. Quarter – t is the tth quarter preceding 
quarter 0, Quarter t is the tth quarter following quarter 0, vice versa. 
Target-initiated 
Rumour 




The target firm is rumoured in financial distress. 
Advisor Hired Rumour Target firm has retained the service of investment bank or advisor. 
 
 
